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The Capital Gains Treasure Chest:
Rational Extension or Expedient
Distortion?*
Melvin G. Dakint
I.
A study of the recent hearings of the Ways and Means Com-
mittee on the topic of capital gains and losses' is not an exhilarat-
ing experience. One closes the volume with the feeling that
there are very few, if any, taxpayers who are not being put upon
in one way or another by the imposition of a tax on capital gains.
However, the variety of voices raised before the committee
expresses eloquently the array of interests which Congress must
as best it can attempt to deal with in that handbook of Ameri-
cana, the Internal Revenue Code,2 and more specifically in the
sections of it devoted to capital gains.8
In the main the proponents of change in the existing law
are: (1) representatives of groups having income already in
part classified as capital gain and who wish to abolish the tax
on such gains altogether or to ameliorate it by lowering the rate
of tax; (2) representatives of groups having income from sales
or exchanges of property now treated as ordinary income but
which might be made eligible for capital gain treatment by
appropriate amendment shortening the present holding period; or
(3) representatives of groups having income from sales or ex-
changes of property of a kind which, though now excluded from
capital gain treatment, can be rendered eligible by redefining
capital asset transactions so as to include their transactions. Illus-
trative of the first group are long-term (six months or more)
* Based on a paper delivered before the 1953 Tax Institute of
Mississippi.
t Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. Hearings before Committee on Ways and Means, General Revenue
levision, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. 959-1207 (1953).
2. 53 STAT. 1-504 (1939), 26 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. (1946).
3. 26 U.S.C. §§ 111, 112, 113, 117 (1946).
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investors in securities and other properties.4 Illustrative of the
second group are short-term (less than six months) securities
and commodities speculators.5 Illustrative of the third class are
those farming interests whose breeding stock has not yet been
included in the definition of capital assets," border-line operators
in real estate sales and development,7 and a miscellany of inter-
ests some of whom, such as recipients of corporate dividends," do
not even purport to be carrying on sales or exchanges of property.
Proponents of change in the rate of tax on capital gains, or
in the period for which property must be held to qualify a capital
gain as "long-term" and hence subject to the reduced rate, pitch
their case on the need for increasing the mobility of venture
capital by eliminating a tax whose impact is felt only when an
investment is turned into cash or other property at a profit9
They argue quite plausibly that such a tax operates as a deter-
rent to a necessary shifting of investments if the economy is to
be kept dynamic.
Congress has wrestled with the problem for decades in its
two-fold aspect and has sought solutions in: (1) a holding period
which will, with some semblance of plausibility, separate long-
term investments from speculation; and (2) a ceiling rate which
will, with some semblance of equity, reflect the fact that realized
gains from property transactions may consist of the accumulated
gains in the value of property over several taxable years and that
consequently the tax burden should not be higher than it would
have been if spread over such taxable years.10 It is, of course, the
sharply progressive surtax which will otherwise be applicable to
all gains "realized" in the taxable year which causes inequities. 1
4. Hearings, supra note 1, at 1006.
5. Id. at 991.
6. Id. at 1167.
7. Id. at 1028.
8. Id. at 1200.
9. Id. at 965.
10. SEIDMAN, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF FEDERAL INCOME TAX LAWS, 1938-1861,
362-63 (1938).
11. The basic provision is, of course, § 22(a) [26 U.S.C. § 22(a) (1946)]
which provides in pertinent part: "Gross income includes gains, profits,
and income derived from . . . trades, businesses, commerce, or sales, or
dealings in property, whether real or personal, growing out of the ownership
or use of or interest in such property.... ." (Italics supplied.) Without
more, this provision subjects all included gains or profits of individuals and
estates and trusts to the normal and graduated surtax rates provided in
§ 11 and 12 and all such gains and profits of corporations to the normal and
ungraduated surtax rates provided in §§ 13 and 15. Section 117(c), how-
ever, provides in effect a ceiling of 25 percent in such surtax rates if the
property from the sale or exchange of which a gain or profit is derived
qualifies as a "capital asset."
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Elsewhere in the Code "bunched income" from such sources
as professional fees, literary and artistic compositions, and other
designated sources is dealt with by averaging devices.12 Here,
however, Congress has chosen to manipulate the rate of tax in
the interest of equity. That neither the rate nor the holding
period can be fixed to please all the affected taxpayer interests
is amply evidenced in the two hundred and fifty pages of testi-
mony and exhibits contained in the current revenue revision
hearings.
On the other hand, the third group of proponents of "change
by redefining capital assets" are not necessarily concerned at all
with such policy considerations as maintaining the mobility of
investment. To some in this group this is merely a "low pres-
sure" area in the Code into which they would like to move;
whether their transactions are theoretically entitled to the spe-
cial treatment there provided is of no matter so long as the sub-
stantial tax benefits can be attained. To these, attaining the
capital gains classification is to succeed in opening the treasure
chest.' 3 Unwisely opening the "treasure chest" to a few has
introduced a corrosive into the "capital gains"-"ordinary income"
classification which may destroy it and which has already cre-
ated serious inequities.' 4
Wherever the effect of judicial interpretation or congressional
"redefinition" of capital assets has been to convert ordinary
income into capital gain, there is the possibility that the sections
have been distorted, either inadvertently or expediently. Whether
current changes, proposed or already embodied in the Code, are
expedient distortions in response to taxpayer pressure groups or
rational extensions of the capital gains theory is best considered
in the light of their statutory and judicial history.
The history is not as sharply drawn as one might wish, but
there is enough to support some speculation. Analysis begins
with Section 117 (a) (1) ,' which, after stating that "capital assets"
means property held by the taxpayer, excludes: "(A) stock in
trade of the taxpayer or other property of a kind which would
properly be included in the inventory of the taxpayer if on hand
at the close of the taxable year, or property held by the taxpayer
primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary course of his
12. 26 U.S.C. § 107 (1946).
13. Hearinga, supra note 1, at 1015, 1018.
14. Id. at 1167.
15. 26 U.S.C. § 117 (1946).
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trade or business"; and "(B) property [held by the taxpayer],
used in the trade or business, of a character which is subject to
the allowance for depreciation provided in section 23 (1). .... "
Thus Congress leads off Section 117 (a) by including every-
thing in the way of property held by the taxpayer as capital
assets, the theory being that changes in the value of the prop-
erty, as distinguished from its income, should be taxed as "long-
term" investment gains and losses. But the man in trade or busi-
ness who is merchandising a stock of goods is obviously realizing
his ordinary annual income by turning "property" at a gross
profit out of which he then deducts his charges for expenses and
an allowance for capital used up by way of wear and tear. Dis-
regarding up and down movements in the price levels, the profit
on his stock of goods is no more than recompense for his entre-
preneurial efforts. So the Code excludes stock in trade from
long-term investment status. If the taxpayer is not merchandis-
ing a stock of goods in the grocery store sense, however, he may
be building houses for sale or buying houses for resale; in that
event his product is not such that he needs to resort to the con-
ventional inventory in order to determine his profit and loss,
since each unit is sufficiently important and identifiable so that
the profit can be computed separately for each one. Again, how-
ever, annual gross profits on such sales should theoretically
enable him to cover his expenses, return to him capital for prop-
erty used up via depreciation, and leave a normal recompense for
his time and the use of his capital. His houses are "property of
a kind properly ... included in the inventory of the taxpayer if
on hand at the close of the taxable year, or property held by the
taxpayer primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary course
of his trade or business."'16 Consequently, such property is
excluded from investment status.
On the other hand, why exclude depreciable property used
in the trade or business? Any decrease or increase in such prop-
erty would seem to come within the conception of income-
producing investment rather than stock in trade and ought to
be eligible for the capital gains concession on the theory that
such value increases are long-term increments.17 Actually Con-
gress excluded such property in 1938 because taxpayers were
finding that in the disposition of partially depreciated assets in
16. 26 U.S.C. § 117(a) (1) (A) (1946).
17. SEJLTZER, THE NATURE AND TAX TREATMENT OF CAPITAL GAINS AND
Lossis 4 (1951).
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order to acquire improved types of equipment they were suffer-
ing losses which as capital losses were usable to only a limited
extent.' But Congress might have excluded such depreciable
assets for the very sound reason that depreciation allowances
are not sufficiently precise so that the adjusted basis resulting
can be said to be correlated with its investment or capital value
for purposes of both loss and gain. Thus, if the adjusted basis
had increased or decreased due to fluctuations in the price level
or for other reasons, those fluctuations could be presumed to be
the result of the long pull and hence eligible for investment
treatment. But depreciation provisions, as we have noted, are
neither precise nor immune to some degree of manipulation, and
the temptation is very strong, as a consequence, to over depreci-
ate, since in so doing more of the asset cost is taken against
current income and upon disposition more of the profit incident
to its use is recovered as capital gain rather than ordinary
income.' This possibility of conversion is avoided by excluding
such depreciable property from the capital gains concession.
Rectification of errors in depreciation allowances is achieved by
taxing any gain upon the sale of such property at ordinary income
rates and allowing any loss as an ordinary loss.20
Four years later, however, we were at a crucial stage in the
war. A piece of equipment used in a trade or business for a
number of years during which depreciation allowances were taken
pursuant to Section 23(1) often had an adjusted basis of very
modest proportions (in some instances, no doubt as a result of
over-depreciation) compared with the fair market value it could
command in the midst of the exigencies of war. As a House com-
mittee in 1942 commented: "[I]t appears that many taxpayers
are able to dispose of their depreciable property at a gain over
its depreciated cost. To treat such a gain as an ordinary gain will
result in an undue hardship to the taxpayer. For example, a
taxpayer sells certain trawlers used in his business to the
Government. If the gain from the sale is regarded as an ordinary
gain it may result in the taxpayer receiving practically nothing
18. SEIDMAN, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF FEDERAL INCOME TAX LAws, 1938-1861,
65 (1938).
19. Of. § 117(g) (3) added to the Code by Congress in 1950 [64 STAT. 941
(1950), 26 U.S.C.A. § 117(g)(3) (Supp. 1953)] in connection with the pro-
vision for amortization of emergency facilities. In this provision Congress
has dealt specifically with the problem of preventing the conversion of
ordinary gain into capital gain via disproportionate depreciation allowances.
See also notes in. A.L.I., FEDERAL INCOME TAX STATUTE 257 (Tent. Draft No.
4, 1951).
20. 26 U.S.C. §§ 22(a), 23(e) (1946).
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for his property. Another example is where the proceeds of
insurance on destroyed property exceed the cost of the property.
The existing law treats such gain as ordinary income."21
Whether such gain can be categorically labelled a long-term
enhancement of investment value rather than a short-term specu-
lative gain might perhaps be open to question, but it is in any
event not the normal profit which the operator expected to realize
out of the use of a depreciable asset in his trade or business. And
whatever its theoretical status, if taking it as ordinary gain repre-
sented an impediment to getting equipment needed for the war
effort into use, -theory was apt to get only summary consideration.
The obvious way of insuring that such transfers would be freely
made was to move such property back into the category of
capital assets with the attendant advantages in the way of gain
limitations. At the same time, however, there was no disposition
to take away the loss advantages enjoyed as non-capital assets
in the event the amount realized was less than adjusted, basis.
To meet both objectives, Section 117 (j) was added and Sections
117 (a) (1) (A) and (B) were left untouched. The 1942 version
of Section 117 (j) provided:
"For the purposes of this subsection, the term 'property
used in the trade or business' means property used in the
trade or business, of a character which is subject to the allow-
ance for depreciation provided in section 23 (1), held for
more than 6 months, and real property used in the trade or
business, held for more than 6 months, which is not (A)
property of a kind which would properly be includible in the
inventory of the taxpayer if on hand at the close of the tax-
able year, or (B) property held by the taxpayer primarily
for sale to customers in the ordinary course of his trade or
business. Such term also includes timber with respect to
which subsection (k) (1) or (2) is applicable." 22
That one of the prime purposes of Section 117 (j), quoted
above, was to bring depreciable property useful for war produc-
tion back into an "as if" capital asset category for purposes of
computing gain is evident by the way in which the draftsmen
proceeded. They provided that property used in a trade or
business, gainful sales and exchanges of which were to be con-
sidered as gains from the sale of capital assets, should mean
"'property used in the trade or business' of a character which is
21. H.R. REP. No. 2333, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 54 (1942).
22. 26 U.S.C. § 117(j) (1946).
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subject to the allowance for depreciation ... held for more than
6 months .. . which is not (A) property of a kind which would
properly be includible in the inventory of the taxpayer if on
hand at the close of the taxable year, or (B) property held by
the taxpayer primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary
course of his trade or business." The commercial enterprise was
thus carefully precluded from bringing in to the capital gains
category the ordinary transactions from which it realized its
normal annual profit.
Despite this legislative history, Section 117(j) has opened
up a "low pressure tax area" for numerous transactions which
have no flavor of long-term investment realization and which,
but for this provision, would be regarded as the source of normal
annual profits subject to the usual individual surtaxes.
Essentially, a number of the current distortions stem from
the fact that Sections 117 (a) and 117(j) were drafted to take
care of conventional manufacturing, servicing, or merchandising
operations in circumstances where it would be relatively simple
to distinguish between the assets used for manufacturing or
servicing and the services or commodity produced or purchased
for sale. That fact is evidenced by the type of illustrative prob-
lem which the regulations relied upon (and still rely upon) to
demonstrate the sections' application.2 3 Our economy is hardly
as simple as the regulations would have it, however. Inevitably,
and quite fairly, if a concession is to be had or largesse dispensed,
the farmer, the miner, the forester, the inventor, the real estate
operator, and now many others have a quite natural inclination
to move from the high pressure area of surtaxes to the relatively
tolerable pressures of the alternative capital gains tax. All this
has occurred despite the fact that the capital gains concession still
rests primarily on the notion that we are dealing with investment
gains which have accumulated over a period of years; as to such
gains the view has consistently been that they should not be
taxed as they accrue because of our adherence to the principle
that income should not be taxed until it has been realized, and
when realized should not absorb the full impact of the surtax
rates in one tax period. But as Judge Riddick said in Albright v.
United States:24 "Nothing in the language of the Act indicates
an intention on the part of Congress to deny the relief granted
by the section to any taxpayers whose transactions meet the pre-
23. U.S. Treas. Reg. 118, § 39.117(j)-1(e), Example (1) (1963).
24. 173 F.2d 339, 344 (8th Cir. 1949).
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scribed conditions." Some of the present chaos might have been
avoided, however, had Judge Riddick also reflected, as did Judge
Learned Hand dissenting in Commissioner v. Ickkelheimer,2 5
that: ". . . the colloquial words of a statute have not the fixed
and artificial content of scientific symbols; they have a penum-
bra, a dim fringe, a connotation . . . they express an attitude of
will, into which it is our duty to penetrate and which we must
enforce ungrudgingly when we can ascertain it, regardless
of imprecision in its expression."
II.
There is nothing in the legislative history to indicate that
livestock sales in 1942 and prior thereto were suffering because
farmers were unwilling to sell breeding and dairy stock under
circumstances where the adjusted basis was such that substan-
tial and unanticipated ordinary income would be realized. In
fact, it seems relatively unlikely that, except for large farmer-
operators, depreciation accounting for such stock had been
resorted to widely, farm tax accounting being as simplified as it
is for cash basis taxpayers. 26 Nonetheless, there has for a long
time been provision made in the regulations for a reasonable
allowance for depreciation on livestock acquired for work,
breeding, or dairy purposes, unless they are included in an
inventory used to determine profitsY Technically and actually
they thus fall within the literal words of Section 117 (j) as long
as the livestock involved is not properly includible in inventory
or held primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary course of
taxpayer's trade or business; without the provision, however,
sales of such livestock would be a source of ordinary annual
profits.
The basic weakness in the drafting of Sections 117 (a) (1) (A)
and (B) and 117 (j) thus appears to lie in a failure to distinguish
adequately between property subject to depreciation which is
actually being used in a manufacturing, servicing, or merchan-
dising establishment, and hence actually being depreciated, and
property which, while subject to depreciation if put to use (and
hence depreciable property), is actually capable of being mer-
25. 132 F.2d 660, 662 (2d Cir. 1943).
26. One finds, for example, relatively little by way of annotations
covering depreciation of dairy and breeding animals in the tax services
and treatises. See 1 CCH 1952 FED. TAX REP. 9 224 et seq.
27. U.S. Treas. Reg. 118, § 39.23(1)-10 (1953).
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chandised by the taxpayer in the conventional sense.28 The
Treasury blurred this distinction in its initial ruling on livestock
sales and was unable to bring these transactions back into focus
thereafter before the policy-making had been taken over by the
judiciary in the Albright litigation.2 9 Thus, if, from the begin-
ning, sales of established draft, dairy, or breeding stock (depreci-
ated or being depreciated) had been admitted to capital gains
treatment, the analogy to ordinary depreciable physical equip-
ment might have been maintained to some more satisfactory
extent. Instead, however, the Treasury included in the "culls"
which it ruled ineligible for the treatment and "held primarily
for sale," "animals which had passed their state of economic use-
fulness."3 0 But animals in this category are presumably wholly
analogous to any piece of equipment subject to depreciation dur-
ing the period it was utilized in the trade or business. The basic
reason for dairy and breeding herds being eligible for Section
117 (j) treatment at all was their depreciable status. Almost by
definition this excluded the possibility of their being held for sale
in the conventional sense31-yet the Treasury sought to so
classify them.
When the litigation stage was reached in the livestock "breed-
ing herd" cases, the crucial status of the animals as depreciable
property was glossed over in the process of formulating issues
for trial. The taxpayer in the Albright case, for example, had
only the burden of showing that the animals were depreciable.3 2
28. Depreciating an asset "used in the trade or business" necessarily
implies a process of charging off each year, as part of cost of operations,
the estimated portion of asset cost deemed to be used up in making and
marketing that year's product. "Sale" in the sense used in the phrase
"held primarily for sale" implies a holding for gainful disposition of the
entire asset during an accounting period.
29. Albright v. United States, 173 F.2d 339 (8th Cir. 1949).
30. In 1944 I.T. 3666 was issued (1944 CUM. BULL. 270) providing: "The
sale of animals culled from the breeding herd as feeder or slaughter ani-
mals in the regular course of business is not to be treated as the sale of a
capital asset." In 1945 I.T. 3712 was issued (1945 CuM. BULL. 176) providing
that "culled from the breeding herd" means: ". . . the normal selection for
sale of those animals which, due to Injury, age, disease, or for any other
reason (other than that of changing the breed or the quality of the off-
spring) are no longer desired by the livestock raiser for breeding purposes,
and also the normal selection for sale of animals for the purpose of main-
taining the herd at a regular size. The primary factor is normal practice in
the case of the particular taxpayer involved." In further amplification to
the Ways and Means Committee and in argument in the Albright litigation
it was stated that: "'"Culls" not only represent animals sold because they
had passed their state of economic usefulness or were undesirable for other
purposes but also represent animals regularly sold from the breeding or
dairy herd in order to keep the herd at a desirable size.'
31. See note 28 supra.
32. Albright v. United States, 173 F.2d 339, 342 (8th Cir. 1949).
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He did not have to show, presumably, that allowances for depreci-
ation as provided in Section 23 (1) had been or were being taken
in connection with the annual use of such animals. Such an allow-
ance is permitted as a deduction against ordinary income only if
it represents a portion of capital invested which has been used
up during the taxable year in the trade or business.3 3 Instead,
government counsel seemed to level its attack primarily at the
alleged inability of taxpayer to show that the culls were "prop-
erty not held ... primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary
course of ... trade or business" as defined in the rulings of the
Treasury.8 4
Had issue been joined on the status of the animals as "pro-
ductive plant actually being depreciated," while the government
might still have lost a part of the suit, it would have served to
bring out the true objective of the relief offered under Section
117 (j).35 Perhaps it would have deterred Congress from opening
the capital gains "treasure chest" any wider; it might even have
the effect of prompting Congress to close it at least as to sales
of "animals regularly sold from the breeding or dairy herd in
order to keep the herd at desirable size" and as to sales of "breed-
ing animals which were used for the production of only one
offspring or one litter of offspring."8 6
But after the Albright case8 7 had lighted the way, the happy
enterprise of converting ordinary income into capital gain got
into full swing in other circuits and in other types of transactions.
A survey of the annotations to Section 117 (j) in code, treatise,
and tax service would indicate the Treasury fought a losing
battle. 8 It was fought out, not on the basis of whether the prop-
erty sold or exchanged was the kind of depreciable property
Congress had primarily in mind88 and whether it had or could be
depreciated in accordance with Section 23 (1), but on the ground
of whether it was "properly includible in the inventory" or "held
. . . primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary course
of ... trade or business."
33. U.S. Treas. Reg. 118, § 39.23(1)-1 (1953).
34. See note 30 supra.
35. I find Judge Delehant's opinion in Laflin v. United States, 100 F.
Supp. 353 (D. Neb. 1951), one of the most thoughtful on the proper role of
§ 117(j) in livestock transactions; it bears comparison with the opinion in
Albright v. United States, 173 F.2d 339 (8th Cir. 1949).
36. Compare MImEo. 6660, 1951 CuM. BULL. 60 with U.S. Treas. Reg. 118,
§ 39.117(j)-2(b) and (c), Example (3) (1953).
37. 173 F.2d 339 (8th Cir. 1949).
38. See, e.g., 3 MERTENS, THE LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION §§ 22.10,
22.11a (Supp. 1953).
39. 26 U.S.C. §§ 22(a), 22(e) (1946).
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The Fifth Circuit accepted this latter as the issue in United
States v. Bennett40 and arrived at a result, with respect to "culls
from a breeding herd," in agreement with that reached by the
Eighth Circuit in the Albright case. The government was here
contending that "primarily held for sale" as used in the statute
meant "ultimately held for sale."'4 1 The taxpayer was contending
that "first" or "initially held for sale" was the appropriate syn-
onym. The Court, however, found the taxpayer's argument
wholly reasonable "that when the business of the cattleman is to
breed and sell calves, and his breeding herd, though obtained
from the cattle he raised, is kept and maintained for that purpose,
there is no more reason to say of these cattle that they are kept
primarily for sale than to say it of cattle which are bought for
breeding and sold when and because their breeding uses are
over." And the Court expressed "complete disagreement . . .
with the Collector's point that since it was known before the
calves were dropped that each would certainly be sold, either
while still a calf or after its usefulness as a breeder was past, it
ought to be held that all of the stock bred and raised on the ranch
was kept primarily for sale." Such a view was deemed by the
Court to be "a severely narrow and restricted point of view
wholly unreasonable, impractical and unsound.
42
It is hardly "impractical and unsound" to point out, how-
ever, that the capital gains treatment was intended by Congress
to alleviate hardship incident to realizing in one year enhance-
ments in value accruing over several tax periods. 48 Such a case
is hardly presented where each year's livestock operations result
in the sale of "culls" at market prices and there is no "bunching"
of gains. The Treasury is merely attempting, within the confines
of almost unworkable legislation, to prevent the conversion of
what are pretty clearly ordinary, and probably not abnormal,
annual profits into capital gains.
44
40. 186 F.2d 407 (5th Cir. 1951).
41. Id. at 409, 410.
42. Id. at 410.
43. SEIDMAN, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF FEDERAL INCOME TAX LAWS, 1938-1861,
363 (1938).
44. In the case of the cash basis cattleman, the inequitable aspects of
the transaction do not end with the advantage of a cut rate tax applied to
ordinary profits; if a "cull" is one which he has raised himself he may
already have deducted the costs incident thereto against the ordinary
income of a prior year. Thus, to cite an example used by the Secretary of
the Treasury in a letter to Congress: "A cash-basis farmer spends $100 in
raising to maturity a dairy animal which is later culled from the herd and
sold for $150. The $100 is deductible in full as a business expense and the
gain on sale is $150, the basis of the animal being regarded as zero. Of
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Incidentally, another use of Section 117 (j) as a cut rate tax
device was uncovered by agricultural interests almost concur-
rently with its use in connection with livestock sales. This was
its use in connection with the sale of land with a growing crop
thereon. Thus in 1942, when Section 117 (j) was added, dis-
positions of "real property used in the trade or business of the
taxpayer" were still "capital assets" although depreciable equip-
ment thereon (or therein) had been excluded, as has been noted.
Presumably to qualify the disposition of an entire plant (real
estate and plant equipment) for capital gains treatment if it
resulted in a gain, and to give all of it ordinary loss status if
the disposition resulted in a loss, such real estate was in 1942
excluded from the definition of capital assets in Section 117 (a) (1)
and included in the "as if" capital assets treatment in Section
117 (j). 41 As in the case of depreciable property, the real estate
must not be "property of a kind which would properly be in-
cluded in the inventory if on hand at the close of the taxable
year" nor "property held by the taxpayer primarily for sale to
customers in the ordinary course of his trade or business. '46 Thus
there was again a careful attempt on the part of Congress to pre-
clude transactions which would be a source of ordinary annual
profits from enjoying capital gains treatment. As a corollary, it
seems quite unlikely that the draftsmen envisaged sales of
unharvested crops in connection with a sale of land as trans-
actions involving sudden sharp enhancement of capital values
which it would be a hardship to subject to ordinary surtaxes.
But here again, "growing crops" are, for many purposes of local
this $150, only $75 is recognized for tax purposes, so that in effect the
farmer has $25 excess deductions over income. An accrual-basis farmer, on
the other hand, in accordance with general practice, inventories his dairy
animals at round figures representing the estimated costs normally Incurred
in raising animals of this class. The average cost is $100. He sells one of
the animals for $150. His gain is $50, of which $25 is recognizable for tax
purposes. Thus he is taxed on $50 more than the cash-basis farmer." But
an accrual-basis farmer may not change to cash basis without the consent
of the Commissioner and the consent would hardly be forthcoming where
the method pursued is unquestionably more accurate even though now more
onerous taxwise. If Omar Khayyam were on the scene today, he might well
be tempted to give his old couplet a new twist and ask, "One wonders
what the 'cash-basis farmer' sells one half so precious as the stuff he
buys." The anomalousness of according routine capital gain treatment to
transactions in which the adjusted basis is zero seems not to have troubled
the courts. The anchor section of the procedure, § 111(a), provides: "The
gain from the sale or other disposition of property shall be the excess of
the amount realized therefrom over the adjusted basis provided in section
113(b) for determining gain, and the loss shall be the excess of the adjusted
basis provided in such section for determining loss over the amount realized."
45. SEN. REP. No. 1631, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 50 (1942).
46. 26 U.S.C. § 117(a)(1), (j) (1946).
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land law, realty until severed. And literalists, unconcerned with
resulting distortion of legislative intent, seized the opportunity.
Thus in a case where a taxpayer had sold a fully equipped
orange grove with mature and almost mature fruit unpicked,
reliance upon local land law notions of the scope of "realty"
netted a handsome tax saving.47 The taxpayer here claimed
capital gains treatment for the gain on the crop because it had
been sold with the land, the latter being, of course, clearly
entitled to such treatment. The Fifth Circuit held that, under
Florida law, unsevered fruit is part of the land and follows it
upon conveyance unless in terms reserved. Thus, while the crop
was intended to be eventually sold, the court decided it was not
"primarily held for sale" until it became personal property by
actual or constructive severance from the trees.48 While it was
in the process of being grown it could only be held for a potential
future sale. In effect, because the fruit was real estate under local
law it could not be held "primarily for sale" to customers in the
ordinary course of trade. This decision was reached despite the
established Florida practice of agreeing to sell a crop while still
on the trees in the ordinary course of business and reporting gain
or loss as ordinary income or business deductions.4 9 It was also
reached despite the fact that the taxpayer had taken the expense
of raising this crop as an ordinary deduction against other ordi-
nary income.50 And even as real estate the crop, as distinguished
from the trees, had probably not been held for the requisite six
months under Section 117(j). Nonetheless, the Tax Court was
reversed and the entire proceeds allowed to qualify "as if" a sale
of "capital assets."
A similar result was reached by the Tenth Circuit in a case5'
involving the sale of a section of land with a partially matured
crop of wheat thereon. On the other hand, the Ninth Circuit,
without entangling itself in irrelevant questions of conveyancing
and security devices, concluded that the only purpose of a tax-
payer in "holding" the crop portion of an orange grove was to
carry on her business of selling oranges to customers. 52 It was
refreshing, in the light of other decisions, to have the court point
out that Section 117 (j) was for the purpose of relieving from
ordinary taxation the realization of values which had accumu-
47. Owen v. Commissioner, 192 F.2d 1006 (5th Cir. 1951).
48. Id. at 1009.
49. Id. at 1007.
50. Id. at 1009.
51. McCoy v. Commissioner, 192 F.2d 486 (10th Cir. 1951).
52. Watson v. Commissioner, 197 F.2d 56 (9th Cir. 1952).
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lated over a long period of time and that a crop which was
largely the product of effort within the tax year was hardly
entitled to such relief.5 3
But even though the Treasury won a few battles here and
there, it lost the war, as witness the addition, in 1951, of Section
117(j) (3) and the amendment of Section 117(j) (1). The 1951
amendment 54 bluntly includes a sale of growing crops in the
definition of a sale, exchange, or involuntary conversion of "prop-
erty used in the trade or business," thus overriding the Treasury
and those court decisions which required demonstration that such
property was not held "primarily for sale to customers in the
ordinary course of trade or business." Livestock, except poultry,
held for twelve months or more for draft, breeding, or dairy pur-
poses is given similar treatment by the addition of a sentence of
similar import at the end of Section 117 (j) (1).5, However, one
might say that the growing crop sales are unfairly penalized,
since expenses incident to raising a crop so sold are disallowed
as deductions under Section 2456 and required to be added to
basis under Section 113. 5 7
53. Id. at 58. Even though the crop is "real property used in the trade
or business," thought the court, the taxpayer has the burden of proving
that it is real property held for more than six months which is not held
primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary course of business.
54. 65 STAT. 500, 501 (1951), 26 U.S.C.A. § 117(j)(1), (3) (Supp. 1953).
55. Ibid. What are "livestock . . . held . . . for draft, breeding or dairy
purposes" is still left to Treasury to define, however, and new Regulations
118 proceed at § 39.117(j)-2(b) thusly: "The determination whether or not
livestock is held by the taxpayer for a draft, breeding, or dairy purpose
depends upon all of the facts and circumstances in each particular case.
The purpose for which the animal is held is ordinarily shown by the tax-
payer's actual use of the animal. However, a draft, breeding, or dairy purpose
may be present in a case where the animal is disposed of within a reasonable
time after its intended use for such purpose is prevented by accident, dis-
ease, or other circumstance. An animal held for ultimate sale to customers
in the ordinary course of the taxpayer's trade or business may, depending
upon the circumstances, be considered held for a draft, breeding, or dairy
purpose. An animal is not held by the taxpayer for a draft, breeding, or
dairy purpose merely because it is suitable for such purpose or because it
is held by the taxpayer for sale to other persons for use by them for such
purpose. Furthermore, an animal held by the taxpayer for other purposes
is not considered to be held for a draft, breeding, or dairy purpose merely
because of a negligible use of the animal for such purpose or because of
the use of the animal for such purpose as an ordinary or necessary incident
to the purpose for which the animal is held." Six detailed examples follow;
culls are exemplified specifically only in the case of animals discovered to
be sterile.
56. 65 STAT. 501 (1951), 26 U.S.C.A. § 24(f) (Supp. 1953).
57. 65 STAT. 501 (1951), 26 U.S.C.A. § 113(b) (1) (L) (Supp. 1953). The
committee report is revealing: "Your committee recognizes, however, that
when the taxpayer keeps his accounts and makes his returns on the cash
receipts and disbursements basis, the expenses of growing the unharvested
crop or the unripe fruit will be deducted in full from ordinary income,
while the entire proceeds from the sale of the crop, as such, will be viewed
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The statutory solution in the case of unharvested crops seems
a clear distortion which almost necessarily runs counter to the
underlying theory of the section of affording capital gains treat-
ment only to realized long-term enhancements of capital value.
It seems unlikely that the gain on the sale or exchange of either
livestock or annual crops could normally qualify as such an
enhancement.
III.
In the "sale of war-rental housing" cases there is perhaps
more real possibility of "bunched" income since large numbers of
units may be sold after several years of rental status. On the
other hand, the projects have frequently been part of a larger
operation devoted to building and sale of housing units and sales
from the unit have taken place routinely along with other sales
distinguished only perhaps by a lesser sales effort devoted to the
rental units. Such was the situation in the Rollingwood Corpo-
ration case.5s
In this case, involving the sale of houses from a war work-
ers' rental housing development, the issue was deemed to be
whether or not the houses were held primarily for sale or pri-
marily for rent.5 9 The houses were all originally rented, and
they unquestionably qualified for depreciation allowances under
Section 23 (1) since they were the physical equipment from which
the owner produced and sold housing service. The sale or ex-
change basis for the property would accordingly have been ad-
justed to the extent of such allowances. Upon their disposition
they represented the retirement of equipment and, if by sale or
exchange, clearly qualified for the concession contained in Sec-
tion 117 (j), at least by analogy to the transactions for which the
provision was probably originally drafted. Here again, however,
the same basic unit was "stock in trade" as well as "depreciable
property," and the Commissioner contended that the houses were
held "primarily" for sale if "primarily" is taken to mean "essen-
tially" or "substantially" rather than "principally" or "chiefly." 60
as a capital gain.. Actually, of course, the true gain in such cases is the
difference between that part of the selling price attributable to the crop or
fruit and the expenses attributable to its production. Therefore, your com-
mittee's bill provides that no deduction shall be allowed which is attribu-
table to the production of such crops or fruit, but that the deductions so
disallowed shall be included in the basis of the property for the purpose of
computing the capital gain." SEN. REP. No. 781, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 47 (1951).
58. Rollingwood Corp. v. Commissioner, 190 F.2d 263 (9th Cir. 1951).
59. Id. at 265.
60. Id. at 266.
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The court noted that the taxpayer might well have intended to
pursue whichever of the activities of selling or renting proved
to be the most profitable and that it was consequently fair to say
that one of the essential purposes in acquiring or holding the
houses was that of sale. It noted that Section 117 (j) is "intended
to alleviate the burden on a taxpayer whose property has
increased in value over a long period of time from having the
profits from sales taxed at graduated tax rates designed for a
single year's income" and that its "purpose is to protect invest-
ment property as distinguished from stock in trade or property
bought and sold for a profit."' It found, consequently, that it
was not within the legislative purpose that the profits from these
sales be treated as capital gains. But the result was achieved
only with difficulty under a statute which was not precisely
enough drafted to deal with identical units of property playing
both the roles of depreciable physical plant and stock in trade.
For example, a "housing" decision6 2 of the Fifth Circuit shows
no disposition on the part of that court to interpret the statute
so as to prevent the conversion of ordinary income into capital
gain. In this case the rental housing development was only a
small part of a larger house construction and selling enterprise.
The houses were built on the basis of a financing application that
specified for sale or rent, subject, however, to a limitation that
for some months after their construction not more than one-third
of the development could be sold. The houses were depreciated
as commercial property and, when sold, the services of a real
estate agent were not utilized as was the taxpayer's practice
generally. The court found no "permissible" basis for a deter-
mination that the sales of the houses constituted a disposition of
"property held by the taxpayer primarily for sale to customers
in the ordinary course of his trade or business." 63 The legislative
history of Section 117 (j) was not mentioned.
IV.
In the main, Section 117(j) has opened up no new oppor-
tunities for cut rate taxes for ordinary annual profits in the securi-
ties field. Since 1942, when the six months holding period was
adopted,6 4 the short-term trader (who is not a dealer) has enjoyed
capital gains treatment for his profits and losses along with the
61. Id. at 266, 267.
62. Delsing v. United States, 186 F.2d 59 (5th Cir. 1951).
63. Id. at 61.
64. 26 U.S.C. § 117(a)(2), (3), (4), (5) (1946).
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investor, so long as he satisfies this relatively modest holding
requirement. Yet one searches the current hearings almost in
vain for any suggestion from securities interests that the short-
term speculator should be distinguished from the long-term
investor and that the present holding period might, after all, be
a rather adequate device with which to do it. The insistent plea
is rather to shorten the holding period to three months so as to
add "greater mobility to venture capital."6 5 There is, of course,
no intimation that Congress will not stand firm on the present
holding period since any further shortening would serve to
sharpen the anomaly of speculative gains realized on relatively
short-term market changes enjoying the same tax benefits as
clear long-term investment enhancements if the holding of the
property has been six months or more.66 The gains of such a
trader are presently distinguishable from those of a securities
dealer since the trader does not sell "to customers."
Incidentally, the phrase "to customers" was added to Section
117(a) (1) (A) in 1934 in order to prevent traders, as distin-
guished from securities dealers, from taking 100 percent of their
market losses as deductions against ordinary income.67 The inter-
pretation of the section prior to the addition of this phrase was
such as to preclude transactions of such traders from the capital
asset category since their securities or commodities were obvi-
ously held "primarily for sale in the course of trade."66 They
were not, however, held for sale "to customers" in the conven-
tional merchandising sense, and the amendment made it clear
that Congress intended to exclude only the latter trading. The
intended result, of course, was that the transactions of such a
trader would be treated as "sales or exchanges of capital assets"
subject to loss limitations if held the requisite period. The corol-
lary, not sufficiently important in 1934 to merit consideration,
was that gains of such traders would also be subject to the treat-
ment accorded long-term gains whenever the holding require-
ment had been satisfied. In addition, until 1950 such standard
65. E.g., the statement of G. Keith Funston, President, New York Stock
Exchange, Hearings, supra note 1, at 963.
66. H.R. Rep. No. 1860, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 36 (1938). "The short-term
category includes, in the main, speculative gains which it has been the
long-settled policy of Congress to tax in the same manner and to the same
extent as earned income and business profits. This policy is adhered to in
the present bill, and the full amount of an individual's 'short-term' capital
net gains will be included in the computation of his net income."
67. SEIDMAN, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF FEDERAL INCOME TAX LAWS, 1938-1861,
364 (1938).
68. Schafer v. Helvering, 299 U.S. 171 (1936). The cases are collected in
3 MERTENS, THE LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 22.06 (1942).
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market devices as selling "against the box" were available to
convert short-term gains into long-term gains and to turn long-
term losses into more useful short-term losses.69 The profits
derived from such transactions certainly deserve no different
treatment than the annual profits of a used car dealer-certainly
they are hardly to be distinguished in terms of availability for
the purchase of the necessities of life and for income taxes. These
are hardly the increments of many tax periods which it would be
inequitable to tax in full in the year of their realization. 70
V.
Among the loophole plugging (or unplugging) amendments
to Section 117 which constantly engage the attention of Congress
one frequently finds notions which seem so theoretically sound
that it is puzzling that wider use is not made of them. For
example, Congress has evolved a statutory device for dealing
with long-term value enhancements of property such as timber
which has both "investment" and "stock in trade" character-
istics which might well be useful elsewhere. Presently the timber
owner may elect to report as capital gain the difference between
the adjusted basis for depletion of his timber and the fair market
69. This loophole was plugged in 1950 by the addition of Section 117(1),
64 STAT. 932-34 (1950), 26 U.S.C.A. § 117(1) (Supp. 1953).
70. Professor Seltzer, in his penetrating study [THE NATURE AND TAX
TREATMENT OF CAPITAL GAINS AND LossEs 318 (1951)] comments: "The promi-
nence of capital gains as a source of private wealth in the United States,
and the origin of considerable amounts of them, though far from all, in
reinvested corporate profits, early led this country to treat them as ordinary
constituents of income. . . . On the one hand, capital gains add to the eco-
nomic power of individuals no less than ordinary kinds of income. On the
other hand, to treat capital gains as such under a graduated income tax
raises questions of equity and of adverse operational effects upon trans-
actions in capital assets." England ignores such gains entirely for tax
purposes. If a recent "Time" story (Feb. 1, 1954, p. 20, col. 3) is to be credited,
or rather the Inland Revenue man's comments to a "Time" reporter, reported
taxable income is not a criterion by which England's well-to-do can be
determined. Untaxed capital gains, according to the "Time" story, provide
the basis on which much lavish living is maintained. Compare the following
paragraph from a customer letter circulated by Merrill, Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Beane and prompted by a recommendation from the Secretary
of the Treasury on February 23, 1951, that the rate on long-term gains
(property held 6 months or more) be increased from 25 percent to 37% per-
cent: "Every owner of property, including farmers, home owners and
investors, should be vitally interested in this proposed tax because it is the
owner who will pay it-pay it not out of income, but out of capital. ...
None of the leading commercial countries of Europe has a capital gains
tax, not even socialist Britain. They don't have it because it does not make
economic sense. In the last analysis taxes can only be paid from produc-
tion-from wealth created day-by-day. A capital gains tax attempts to
funnel into the government existing capital. Such transfers do not repre-
sent new production and to attempt to levy such a tax tends to dam the
flow of capital. Business as a whole is retarded."
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value of such timber on the first day of the taxable year in
which it was cut. Thereafter, such fair market value is consid-
ered as the cost of such timber for ordinary merchandising pur-
poses, and profits over such fair market value are taxed as or-
dinary income."1 The effect is to recognize that a portion of the
difference between adjusted basis and the selling price of cut
timber may be a long-term enhancement of capital value which
it would be inequitable to subject to surtax rates in the year of its
realization. It would seem completely applicable, for example, to
land held for investment or for other long-term reasons and then
subdivided by the original owner. Such transactions under the
existing statute and interpretations thereof have been decided
by applying the criterion of whether or not held by the taxpayer
"primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary course of trade
or business. '7 2 The results have often been to distort the inci-
dence of tax, in some transactions by taxing as capital gain
what was in part the ordinary annual profit of a subdivider and
in other transactions by taxing as ordinary income what was in
part long-term investment enhancement. The Section 112(k)
procedure would seem applicable as well to many of the "live-
stock" and "housing development" transactions where there may
be, as has been noted, a mixture of ordinary annual profit and
long-term investment enhancement. In fact, it would seem usable
to minimize distortion in any situation where identical units of
property may be either a long-term, income-producing investment
which, however, fluctuates in capital value and thus gives rise to
capital gains or losses, or stock in trade subject to normal mer-
chandising which thus gives rise to ordinary income or business
loss deductions.
Another device worked out for securities dealers might pos-
sibly be useful in the field of real estate operations in order to
assure a dealer of the possibility of making long-term investments
out of some of his holdings which would otherwise be regarded
as stock in trade. Thus, a securities dealer, since a 1951 amend-
ment,73 is able to set aside for long-term investment securities
out of current trading, providing he identifies them in his records
71. 26 U.S.C. § 117(k) (1946).
72. An excellent conception of the variety of judicial results being
arrived at on the basis of available criteria may be obtained by noting the
annotations in, for example, 3 MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION
394 et seq. (Supp. 1953). And see also an excellent article on inadequacies of
present criteria generally in Miller, The "Capital Asset" Concept: A Critique
o0 Capital Gains Taxation, 59 YALE L.J. 837, 1057 (1950).
73. 65 STAT. 503 (1951), 26 U.S.C.A. § 117(n) (Supp. 1953).
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as such within thirty days of acquisition and does not after such
period hold them "primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary
course of his trade or business."
A number of proposals made at the current hearing may
prove fruitful of further general improvement in Section 117. In
the main, however, the voices raised at the hearing table in
Washington were concerned with special interests which it was
felt were not being dealt with fairly in the present capital gains
provisions and their application. In a number of instances it is
true that even the present liberalized version can be applied in
such a way as to exclude some qualified long-term investment
enhancements; 74 objections from those so affected will presumably
be given careful consideration by Congress. But there were also
many proposals made which would simply open the "treasure
chest" further to those baldly seeking a cut-rate tax on ordinary
annual profits. A sympathetic ear lent to such proposals certainly
augurs for little but complete chaos in this field.75
One excellent suggestion is contained in the hearings for
alleviating and perhaps eliminating the myriad of cross-currents
in this troubled area although probably so radical as to gain very
little attention from a harassed but not yet desperate committee.
It was proposed that a more careful classification of capital trans-
actions be combined with some method of averaging both capital
gains and ordinary income over an appropriate period, thus
eliminating the necessity for a differential in the tax rate.7 6
Proposals for averaging, of course, are not new. Professor Simons
of the University of Chicago advocated such an approach for a
number of years before his untimely death.77 Professor Seltzer
of Wayne University includes a fairly lengthy discussion of
74. As witness the statement of Edward J. Grassman, a casual real
estate owner, faced with the prospect of paying a tax on $460,000 as ordinary
gain after holding property for some 30 years. Hearings, supra note 1,
at 1029.
75. See, for example, the arguments for treating the income from
patents as "capital gains," (Hearings, supra note 1, at 1188); and for treat-
ing ordinary corporate dividends as "capital gains," (Hearings, supra note 1,
at 1200). A nice juxtaposition was fortuitously achieved in the hearings
by virtue of the following statement being received into the record imme-
diately after the plea for capital gains status for corporate dividends: "The
American Federation of Labor believes the present 26 percent rate on
capital gains is too low. This low rate has operated as a spur to move more
and more taxpayers to take advantage of the capital-gains section of the
revenue law to escape the regular personal-income-tax rate. The law itself
has been weakened to permit such escape to types of income which should
not be given the preferential treatment given to capital-gains income."
76. Hearings, supra note 1, at 1146.
77. SIMONS, PERSONAL INcOME TAXATION 154 (1938).
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income averaging proposals in his recent penetrating study of
the subject.78 However, the current proposal to be found in the
hearings of the Ways and Means Committee combines with
averaging other procedures which have been very carefully
thought out, and indicates penetrating insights into the problems
involved. 79
The proposal would set to one side physical property acquired
and held for the consumption and use of the individual and his
family and would ignore both gains and losses thereon (with
certain safeguards) on the theory that such property was not
acquired and held for either profit or investment. In the second
class would be put all physical property used in a trade, business,
or profession classifiable as income and profit producing equip-
ment. Applying present Sections 112 and 113 procedures, it is
suggested that the proceeds from the sale or exchange of such
property be usable within an appropriate period for the acqui-
sition of other physical assets of the same kind, undiminished by
income taxes. New assets thus acquired would have their basis
reduced by the amount of the profits thus absorbed, and over
the years the reduced allowances for depreciation resulting would
subject ordinary income to tax in an amount equivalent to the
original basis reduction. As now under Section 112, if the entire
profit was not absorbed in the new asset it would be included in
income. In a third class would be placed depreciable property
held for the production of income, and here again Sections 112
and 113 procedures would be relied upon to accomplish the post-
ponement and proration of surtax impacts by reducing basis
(and consequently future depreciation allowances) in the event
of sale or exchange and reinvestment in other similar property.
Stocks and bonds would comprise a fourth class, and some pres-
ent notions contained in Section 115 would be relied upon to
deal with the special problems relating to corporate stocks and
undistributed profits. It is, of course, apparent that a Section 112
postponement of tax, without other safeguards, would enable a
taxpayer to pursue for an indefinite period a program of reinvest-
ment in stocks whose values represented in part undistributed
profits. However, it would be quite possible, as now in some
instances, to allow a taxpayer to separate from the proceeds of
78. SELTZER, THE NATURE AND TAX TREATMENT OF CAPITAL GAINS AND LOSSES
310 et seq. (1951).
79. Hearings, supra note 1, at 1161-63; Bravman, Integration of Taxes
on Capital Gains and Income, 37 VA. L. REV. 527 (1951); Bravman, Equaliza-
tion of Tax on All Individuals with the Same Aggregate Income over Same
Number of Years, 50 COL. L. REV. 1 (1950).
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a sale the undistributed earnings for the period held and report
them as ordinary income. If there remained any excess over
basis, taxpayer would then be permitted to postpone taxation
thereon providing that he reinvested in other property held for
the production of income or used in the trade or business. All
other property, including property held for speculation, would
get no special treatment, on the theory that such property would
be held for short periods of time and would be analogous to stock
in trade turned for an annual profit. Any inequities resulting
from the taxing of gains thereon in one period would be amelio-
rated by an averaging process.8 0
On the question of the length of a desirable averaging period,
Professor Seltzer of Wayne University notes that:
"If capital gains alone are considered, the averaging
period necessary to overcome tolerably well the inequitable
consequences of applying graduated rates to bunched realiza-
tions is much shorter . . . than might be imagined.... [A]n
averaging period as short as 5 or even 3 years would be suffi-
cient in most instances to eliminate any sizeable tax penalties
otherwise created by a concentration of capital gains in a
single year. If the sole object of the present preferential tax
rates on capital gains is to offset the over-taxation of bunched
gains under a graduated rate schedule, the offset is excessive.
The present rates are materially lower than those that would
prevail even under an averaging period as long as 20
years." 8'
Under a carefully worked out averaging system the indi-
vidual taxpayer would have nothing to gain by deferring the
taking of a profit or accelerating the realization of a loss, because
the ultimate tax would be the same whether the transactions
take place at the beginning or at the end of the averaging period
or in any year in between. Individuals could dispose of their
property whenever the opportunity to make a profit presented
itself. Assuming a relatively long averaging period, they could
earn as much income as they were able, when they were able,
and yet not be penalized for concentrating such profit or income
in their most productive years. Also, as Professor Simons has
colorfully pointed out, it would eliminate the "now or never,"
80. Hearings, supra note 1, at 1163.
81. SELTZER, THE NATURE AND TAX TREATMENT OF CAPITAL GAINS AND LOSSES
310 (1951).
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"grab all you can" attitude among enforcement officers which
the present system cultivates. As Simons comments:
"If we had a law under which the Treasury could bide
its time-could calmly let taxpayers overcharge here and
there, circumvent realizations, futilely conduct tax reorgani-
zations to their hearts' content, and convert ordinary income
into capital gains, confident always of a final, complete
reckoning-there would perhaps be little occasion to worry
much about reasonableness and flexibility in administrative
practice."8 2
Within a framework of classification and averaging, a scheme
of income taxation is surely possible which would enable us to
keep productive capital at work unimpaired as long as it was not
converted to personal uses. We can surely find a way "so to
arrange matters that precisely the same tax liability will arise no
matter when the taxpayer carries through his transaction and
no matter what form he causes the transaction to assume," and
we can also "evolve a method of purchasing mobility [of capital]
at a lower cost in terms of equity."83
82. Simons, Federal Tax Reform, 14 U. oF CH. L. REv. 20, 28 (1946).
83. Miller, The "Capital Asset" Concept: A Critique of Capital Gains
Taxation, 59 YALE L.J. 1057, 1082 (1950).
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